CONSTRUCTION OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR CALCULATING STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE LOSSES AS STATE LOSSES IN EFFORTS TO INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF CORRUPTION ERADICATION
This study aims to find answers to the arguments why the calculation of BUMN losses has not been regulated as state losses so that the quality of eradicating corruption is less effective and efficient and to formulate regulation of BUMN losses as state losses to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of eradicating corruption. This research is sociologic using a case approach, legislation, comparison, and context analyzed with legal analysis theory from an economic perspective, Anthony Allot's theory of effectiveness and legal cybernetics with a summary of the literature related to BUMN, good corporate governance, state losses and corruption, and corporation crimes. The results of the study show the argumentation why BUMN losses have not been regulated as state losses so that the quality of corruption eradication is less effective and efficient because there are problems that include juridical problems of a dualism of BUMN accountability, casuistry problems in calculating state losses after the Constitutional Court Decision Number 25/PUU-XIV/2016 and interventionist problems regarding the direction of SOE policies. Meanwhile, the construction of regulations for calculating BUMN losses as state losses to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of eradicating corruption is realized through the construction of juridical regulations aimed at BUMN laws, limited liability companies, corruption crimes, and state finances. Furthermore, there is an audit of institutional construction and a system for calculating BUMN losses, the arrangements for which are embodied in a separate law.
BUMN Losses, State Losses, Construction, Corruption